Patients with disorders of consciousness after severe brain injury need surrogate decision makers to guide treatment decisions on their behalf. Formal guidelines for surrogate decisionmaking generally instruct decision makers to first appeal to a patient's written advance directive, followed by making a substituted judgment of what the patient would have chosen, and lastly, to make decisions according to what seems to be in the patient's best medical interests. Substituted judgment is preferable because it is taken to preserve patient autonomy, by using a patient's past wishes and values to reconstruct what they would have chosen for themselves. In this paper, the author argues that for a certain population of patients, the standard interpretation of substituted judgment cannot ensure the preservation of patient autonomy. Patients with "covert awareness" may continue to have values and an authentic sense of self, which may differ from their past values and wishes. Accordingly, surrogate decision makers should make decisions based on how the patient is likely to experience their condition in the present, rather than their past wishes and values.
As they age, many people are afraid that they might become a burden to their families and friends. In fact, fear of being a burden is one of the most frequently cited reasons for individuals who request physician aid in dying. Why is this fear so prevalent, and what are the issues underlying this concern? I argue that perceptions of individual autonomy, dependency, and dignity all contribute to the fear of becoming a burden. However, this fear is misplaced; common conceptions of these values should be re-framed and re-examined. Practices that support a more community-centered type of autonomy can be found in dependency and dignity. This paper offers some practical examples of how to address common end-of-life situations that may cause anxiety to patients who are worried about being a burden. These practices include discussing expectations, both for care and how the relationship among the participants might change, and modeling respectful caregiving behaviors. Most difficult of all, though, includes cultural and societal attitude changes so that people recognize the good in receiving care and get used to the idea that they do not need to do anything to be valuable.
Ageing has been recognized as one of the most critically important health-care issues worldwide. It is relevant to Asia, where the increasing number of older populations has drawn attention to the paramount need for health-care investment, particularly in end-of-life care. The advocacy of advance care planning is a mean to honor patient autonomy. Since most East Asian countries are influenced by Confucianism and the concept of 'filial piety,' patient autonomy is consequently subordinate to family values and physician authority. The dominance from family members and physicians during a patient's end-of-life decision-making is recognized as a cultural feature in Asia. Physicians often disclose the patient's poor prognosis and corresponding treatment options to the male, family member rather to the patient him/herself. In order to address this ethical and practical dilemma, the concept of 'relational autonomy' and the collectivism paradigm might be ideally used to assist Asian people, especially older adults, to share their preferences on future care and decision-making on certain clinical situations with their families and important others. In this review article, we invited experts in end-of-life care from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan to briefly report the current status of advance care planning in each country from policy, legal and clinical perspectives. According to the Asian experiences, we have seen different models of advance care planning implementation. The Asian Delphi Taskforce for advance care planning is currently undertaken by six Asian countries and a more detailed, culturally sensitive whitepaper will be published in the near future.
OBJECTIVE: to understand the meanings attributed by nurses about conditions that interfere in defending of the elderly's autonomy on the terminality of life in the context of hospitalization.
METHOD: qualitative and exploratory study, which applied the Grounded Theory. Data were collected between November 2016 and May 2017, in the internal medicine wards of a hospital in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, through non-participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Three sample groups composed of ten nurses, eight doctors, and 15 nursing technicians were investigated.
RESULTS: the conditions are related to the medical power, subordination of nurses, family influences; the functional decline of the elderly; and biomedical model. Final considerations: the elderly's autonomy is veiled and violated since their abilities are subjugated, and the family's will and professional paternalism may prevail. However, this right must guide contemporary care models and integrate palliative care.
Key ethical challenges for healthcare workers arising from the COVID-19 pandemic are identified: isolation and social distancing, duty of care and fair access to treatment. The paper argues for a relational approach to ethics which includes solidarity, relational autonomy, duty, equity, trust and reciprocity as core values. The needs of the poor and socially disadvantaged are highlighted. Relational autonomy and solidarity are explored in relation to isolation and social distancing. Reciprocity is discussed with reference to healthcare workers' duty of care and its limits. Priority setting and access to treatment raise ethical issues of utility and equity. Difficult ethical dilemmas around triage, do not resuscitate decisions, and withholding and withdrawing treatment are discussed in the light of recently published guidelines. The paper concludes with the hope for a wider discussion of relational ethics and a glimpse of a future after the pandemic has subsided.
Les soins palliatifs demandent de plus en plus de compétences médicales, soignantes, humaines et éthiques, afin d’asseoir leur légitimité dans des domaines de plus en plus pointus de la médecine – réanimation, néonatalogie, cancérologie, gériatrie – ainsi que dans la diversité des prises en charge, y compris au domicile ou en EPHAD.
Dans ce contexte de développement des formations et d’élargissement des champs de compétences de la pratique palliative, cette 5e édition du manuel offre :
-les indispensables connaissances thérapeutiques ;
-les outils, à destination des professionnels en vue d’acquérir une compétence clinique pour la rencontre et l’accompagnement humain, psychique et relationnelle de la personne malade ;
-une contextualisation de la pratique des soins palliatifs dans leur dimension sociale, sanitaire et politique ;
-des jalons pédagogiques pour le développement des soins palliatifs dans leur dimension pédagogique et de recherche.
BACKGROUND: Respect for autonomy is a paramount principle in end-of-life ethics. Nevertheless, empirical studies show that decision-making, exclusively focused on the individual exercise of autonomy fails to align well with patients' preferences at the end of life. The need for a more contextualized approach that meets real-life complexities experienced in end-of-life practices has been repeatedly advocated. In this regard, the notion of 'relational autonomy' may be a suitable alternative approach. Relational autonomy has even been advanced as a foundational notion of palliative care, shared decision-making, and advance-care planning. However, relational autonomy in end-of-life care is far from being clearly conceptualized or practically operationalized.
MAIN BODY: Here, we develop a relational account of autonomy in end-of-life care, one based on a dialogue between lived reality and conceptual thinking. We first show that the complexities of autonomy as experienced by patients and caregivers in end-of-life practices are inadequately acknowledged. Second, we critically reflect on how engaging a notion of relational autonomy can be an adequate answer to addressing these complexities. Our proposal brings into dialogue different ethical perspectives and incorporates multidimensional, socially embedded, scalar, and temporal aspects of relational theories of autonomy. We start our reflection with a case in end-of-life care, which we use as an illustration throughout our analysis.
CONCLUSION: This article develops a relational account of autonomy, which responds to major shortcomings uncovered in the mainstream interpretation of this principle and which can be applied to end-of-life care practices.
BACKGROUND: The Cancer Home-Life Intervention showed no significant effects, and examination of the processes affecting or inhibiting outcomes is relevant.
AIM: To evaluate the Cancer Home-Life Intervention for its processes of implementation, mechanisms of impact and contextual factors.
DESIGN: Process evaluation conducted alongside the randomised controlled trial, using quantitative and qualitative methods (ClinicalTrials.gov NCT02356627). The Cancer Home-Life Intervention is a tailored, occupational therapy-based programme.
SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: This study took place in participants' homes and at hospital. A total of 113 home-dwelling adults (>=18 years) with advanced cancer who had received the Cancer Home-Life Intervention were included, together with five intervention-therapists.
RESULTS: All 113 participants (100%) received a first home visit; 32 participants (26%) received a second visit; and 4 participants (3%) received a third visit. Median number of delivered intervention components were 3 (interquartile range: 2; 4). Identified barriers for effect included unclear decision process for intervention dosage; participants' low expectations; participants' lack of energy; and insufficient time to adopt new strategies. The trial design constituted a barrier as the intervention could only be provided within a specific short period of time and not when relevant. Intervention components working to solve practical everyday problems, enhance enjoyment and increase a sense of safety were perceived as useful.
CONCLUSION: Future interventions can benefit from inclusion criteria closely related to the intervention focus and clear procedures for when to continue, follow-up and terminate intervention. Decisions about dose and timing may benefit from learning theory by taking into account the time and practice needed to acquire new skills.
Fifteen years ago, Ruth Macklin shook the medical community with her claim in the BMJ that dignity is a useless concept. Her essay provoked a storm of reactions. What have we learned from the debate? In this article I analyse the responses to her essay and the following debate to investigate whether she was right that “[d]ignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and can be eliminated without any loss of content.” While some of the commentaries misconstrued her claim and argue against strawmen, others forcefully maintained that the concept of dignity has functions beyond “respect for persons and their autonomy.” One important point that came out of the debate is that dignity is a generic concept that covers more ground than “respect for persons or their autonomy.” In particular, dignity seems to have a wide range of protective functions as well as having reciprocal, relational, and social aspects. Dignity appears more attributional and norm-formative than respect for persons and autonomy. While the claim that dignity is unclear, vague, and can be used sloganistically seems highly relevant, it is argued that this vagueness fulfils important functions in ethics. Moreover, dismissing dignity because of its lack of clarity has implications for “respect for persons” and “autonomy,” which are also used vaguely and sloganistically. No doubt medical ethics should use as a clear concept as the context requires. Nonetheless, dignity still seems to be a widely used generic concept in ethical debates and doing as much ethical work as “respect for persons” or “respect for autonomy.” Therefore, the death of dignity seems to be greatly exaggerated.
Moral agency is a prerequisite for a full autonomous decision, meaning that the agents have the intrinsic capacity to understand their actions and to be accountable for the consequences of these actions. Palliative care patients have the moral right to build their capacity to decide, so that they are truly empowered to make choices. However, moral and spiritual distress are common at the end-of-life, which may rise if there is a threat to the individual’s integrity and disruption of one’s belief system, consequently leading to the deterioration of the patient’s moral agency. The aim of this paper is to determine if spirituality may be an important tool for the empowerment of palliative care patients and if moral agency can be enhanced by a diligent spiritual advocate. Spiritual awareness, self-knowledge, and specific training are key elements for he spiritual advocate to address patients’ spiritual needs and distress in a neutral and non-directive way, to promote autonomy, well-being, and quality of life. Thus, patients’ dignity and right for self-determination are respected, thereby supporting empowerment, reducing suffering, respecting patients’ individuality, and engaging moral agency. Palliative care patients should be able to fully exercise their autonomy. This strategy might be very appealing for adequate advance care planning, whatever the choices of the patient, as well as to prevent distress, hopelessness, and the lack of meaning that many terminal patients experience.
BACKGROUND: Safeguarding the dignity of patients at the end of life is a key objective in palliative care practice in Denmark. The concept of dignity and how it influences a dying persons' quality of life is thus influential in end-of-life care at hospices. However, what is meant by dignity, how dignity is understood and practiced by healthcare professionals in Danish hospices, and whether this relates to the patients' understandings and needs concerning dignity remains unanswered.
AIM: The aim of this study was to explore and improve dignity in care through an action research study with patients and hospice staff at two different hospices in Denmark. This was done by exploring how patients and healthcare professionals expressed their understandings and needs concerning dignity and involving participants in the research process with the goal of improving dignity in care.
METHODS: An action research method with reflection-of-praxis and action-in-praxis was applied. It was combined with methods of semi-structured individual interviews with twelve patients, five staff and nine focus-group interviews with staff.
RESULTS: Three themes emerged from the analysis of data. The themes were as follows: (1) being understood, (2) contributing and (3) holistic care. Deeper analysis indicated that staff understandings of dignity mostly focused on preserving patients' autonomy, whereas patients expressed needs for relational and spiritual aspects of dignity. Staff were mostly concerned about preserving patients' autonomy when providing dignity in care, however, through the action-in-praxis they increased their awareness on their own praxis and patients' needs and understanding concerning dignity. The theoretical model on dignity presented in the study also worked as a map to guide staffs' reflections on dignity in praxis and facilitated a broader focus on supporting and caring for patients' dignity in care. We believe this study has improved dignity in care at the two hospices involved in the study.
Durant les trois dernières décennies, l’évolution des prises en charge médicales et la réorganisation de notre système de santé ont totalement modifié les rapports entre les professionnels de santé, les patients et leurs proches. La demande de participation des patients à la démarche de soins a été croissante, posant la question de la liberté de choix des malades et questionnant de plus en plus les domaines où celle-ci serait niée.
BACKGROUND: Respect for autonomy is a key concept in contemporary bioethics and end-of-life ethics in particular. Despite this status, an individualistic interpretation of autonomy is being challenged from the perspective of different theoretical traditions. Many authors claim that the principle of respect for autonomy needs to be reconceptualised starting from a relational viewpoint. Along these lines, the notion of relational autonomy is attracting increasing attention in medical ethics. Yet, others argue that relational autonomy needs further clarification in order to be adequately operationalised for medical practice. To this end, we examined the meaning, foundations, and uses of relational autonomy in the specific literature of end-of-life care ethics.
METHODS: Using PRESS and PRISMA procedures, we conducted a systematic review of argument-based ethics publications in 8 major databases of biomedical, philosophy, and theology literature that focused on relational autonomy in end-of-life care. Full articles were screened. All included articles were critically appraised, and a synthesis was produced.
RESULTS: Fifty publications met our inclusion criteria. Twenty-eight articles were published in the last 5 years; publications were originating from 18 different countries. Results are organized according to: (a) an individualistic interpretation of autonomy; (b) critiques of this individualistic interpretation of autonomy; (c) relational autonomy as theoretically conceptualised; (d) relational autonomy as applied to clinical practice and moral judgment in end-of-life situations.
CONCLUSIONS: Three main conclusions were reached. First, literature on relational autonomy tends to be more a 'reaction against' an individualistic interpretation of autonomy rather than be a positive concept itself. Dichotomic thinking can be overcome by a deeper development of the philosophical foundations of autonomy. Second, relational autonomy is a rich and complex concept, formulated in complementary ways from different philosophical sources. New dialogue among traditionally divergent standpoints will clarify the meaning. Third, our analysis stresses the need for dialogical developments in decision making in end-of-life situations. Integration of these three elements will likely lead to a clearer conceptualisation of relational autonomy in end-of-life care ethics. This should in turn lead to better decision-making in real-life situations.
On 26 February 2020, the German Constitutional Court rejected a law from 2015 that prohibited any form of ‘business-like’ assisted suicide as unconstitutional. The landmark ruling of the highest federal court emphasised the high priority given to the rights of autonomy and free personal development, both of which constitute the principle of human dignity, the first principle of the German constitution. The ruling echoes particularities of post-war Germany’s end-of-life debate focusing on patient self-determination while rejecting any discussion of active assistance to die through a lethal injection administered by a doctor. This brief report discusses the ruling in the light of the broader sociopolitical and historical context of the German end-of-life debate.
Background: Some evidence suggests the wish to hasten death is related to poor health-related quality of life. Deficits in perceived dignity and self-efficacy are risk factors for wish to hasten death that also impact health-related quality of life.
Aim: To compare perceived health-related quality of life, dignity and self-efficacy in patients with advanced cancer who either do (case group) or do not (control group) express a wish to hasten death. Cases and controls were matched on sociodemographic and functional characteristics.
Design: A comparative cross-sectional study.
Participants: A total of 153 adult patients with advanced cancer were assessed for wish to hasten death using the Desire for Death Rating Scale. Scores >= 1 indicate some degree of wish to hasten death (case group, n = 51), and score = 0 implies no wish to hasten death (control group, n = 102). Assessments included health-related quality of life using the European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer Quality-of-Life Core 15-Item Palliative Questionnaire, perceived loss of dignity using the Patient Dignity Inventory and self-efficacy using the General Self-Efficacy Scale.
Results: Patients with a wish to hasten death had worse emotional functioning (p < 0.001), greater perceived loss of dignity (p < 0.001) and lower self-efficacy (p = 0.001). There was no difference in most physical symptoms. Perceived overall health-related quality of life was significantly worse for those with a clinically relevant wish to hasten death (p = 0.023) and marginally worse for the case group than the control group (p = 0.052).
Conclusion: Patients with wish to hasten death showed lower perceived dignity, self-efficacy and emotional quality of life than patients without wish to hasten death without necessarily perceiving worse physical symptoms.
In 2015 Robert Veatch published the second edition of his Transplantation ethics, this time together with Lainie Ross. The chapters on postmortem organ procurement distinguish between 'giving' and 'taking' systems, and argue that 'taking' systems may promise a greater yield of organs for transplantation, but inevitably violate a requirement of respect for the deceased's autonomy. That argument has been very influential, and is also representative of a way of thinking that is widespread in the literature and in public debate. In this paper I contend that it is conceptually flawed in a number of important respects. These concern the understanding of both the concept of 'consent' and the requirement of respect for autonomy, the role of the relatives in any procurement system, and the factors that actually determine the extent to which a system respects autonomy, under any interpretation of that requirement.
BACKGROUND: Since the introduction of the concept of advance care planning (ACP), many studies have been conducted exploring beneficial effects. These studies show a heterogeneity in clinical endpoints, which reflects diversity of goals connected to ACP. This study aims to get insight in the range of underlying goals that comprise the legitimacy of ACP.
METHODS: Systematic literature search in PubMed, EMBASE, PsychInfo, CINAHL and Cochrane Library. Articles on normative aspects of ACP were included, based on title and abstract. Due to the quantity of inclusions, of which many had similar content, purposive sampling was used to select articles for full text document analysis. Analysis stopped once saturation was reached.
RESULTS: In total, 6497 unique articles were found of which 183 were included. Saturation was reached after document analysis of 55 articles (30%); this yielded 141 codes concerning goals of ACP and also 70 codes about objections against ACP, which shed light on the underlying goals of ACP as well. We identified five underlying goals: respecting individual patient autonomy, improving quality of care, strengthening relationships, preparing for end-of-life, reducing overtreatment.
CONCLUSIONS: Five distinctive underlying goals of ACP were identified, each with corresponding objections that need to be considered. Specifying underlying goals of ACP may direct the debate on definitions, methods and preferred outcomes of ACP. This study was funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development, grant 839120002.
In a recent paper, Charles Foster argued that the epistemic uncertainties surrounding prolonged disorders of consciousness (PDOC) make it impossible to prove that the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment can be in a patient's best interests and, therefore, the presumption in favour of the maintenance of life cannot be rebutted. In the present response, I argue that, from a legal perspective, Foster has reached the wrong conclusion because he is asking the wrong question. According to the reasoning in two leading cases-Bland and James-the principle of respect for autonomy creates a persuasive presumption against treatment without consent. Therefore, it is the continuation of treatment that requires justification, rather than its withdrawal. This presumption also works as the tiebreaker determining that treatment should stop if there is no persuasive evidence that its continuation is in the best interests of the patient. The presumption in favour of the maintenance of life, on the other hand, should be understood as an evidential presumption on a factual issue that is assumed to be true if unchallenged. However, the uncertainties regarding PDOC actually give reasons for displacing this evidential presumption. Consequently, decision-makers will have to weigh up the pros and cons of treatment having the presumption against treatment without consent as the tiebreaker if the evidence is inconclusive. In conclusion, when the right question is asked, Foster's argument can be turned on its head and uncertainties surrounding PDOC weigh in to justify the interruption of treatment in the absence of compelling contrary evidence.