Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and euthanasia can be debated from ethical and legal perspectives, and there are a variety of views regarding their acceptability and usefulness. Religion is considered an important factor in determining attitudes towards such practices. This narrative review aims to provide an overview of the Islamic perspective on PAS and euthanasia and explore the Islamic approach in addressing the related issues. The PubMed database was searched to retrieve relevant articles, then the references listed in the selected articles were checked for additional relevant publications. Additionally, religious books (Quran and hadith) and legal codes of selected countries were also consulted from appropriate websites. The Islamic code of law discusses many issues regarding life and death, as it considers any act of taking one's life to be forbidden. Islam sanctifies life and depicts it as a gift from God (Allah). It consistently emphasises the importance of preserving life and well-being. Therefore Muslims, the followers of Islam, have no right to end their life. All Islamic doctrines consider PAS and euthanasia to be forbidden. However, if the patient has an imminently fatal illness, withholding or withdrawing a futile medical treatment is considered permissible. From a legal perspective, Islamic countries have not legalised PAS and euthanasia. Such practices are therefore considered suicides when patients consent to the procedure, and homicides when physicians execute the procedure.
OBJECTIVE: To identify barriers, as perceived by parents, to good care for children with life-threatening conditions.
DESIGN: In a nationwide qualitative study, we held in-depth interviews regarding end-of-life care with parents of children (aged 1 to 12 years) who were living with a life-threatening illness or who had died after a medical trajectory (a maximum of 5 years after the death of the child). Sampling was aimed at obtaining maximum variety for a number of factors. The interviews were transcribed and analysed.
SETTING: The Netherlands.
PARTICIPANTS: 64 parents of 44 children.
RESULTS: Parents identified six categories of difficulties that create barriers in the care for children with a life-threatening condition. First, parents wished for more empathetic and open communication about the illness and prognosis. Second, organisational barriers create bureaucratic obstacles and a lack of continuity of care. Third, parents wished for more involvement in decision-making. Fourth, parents wished they had more support from the healthcare team on end-of-life decision-making. Fifth, parents experienced a lack of attention for the family during the illness and after the death of their child. Sixth, parents experienced an overemphasis on symptom-treatment and lack of attention for their child as a person.
CONCLUSIONS: The barriers as perceived by parents focussed almost without exception on non-medical aspects: patient-doctor relationships; communication; decision-making, including end-of-life decision-making; and organisation. The perceived barriers indicate that care for children with a life-threatening condition focusses too much on symptoms and not enough on the human beings behind these symptoms.
BACKGROUND: Respect for autonomy is a paramount principle in end-of-life ethics. Nevertheless, empirical studies show that decision-making, exclusively focused on the individual exercise of autonomy fails to align well with patients' preferences at the end of life. The need for a more contextualized approach that meets real-life complexities experienced in end-of-life practices has been repeatedly advocated. In this regard, the notion of 'relational autonomy' may be a suitable alternative approach. Relational autonomy has even been advanced as a foundational notion of palliative care, shared decision-making, and advance-care planning. However, relational autonomy in end-of-life care is far from being clearly conceptualized or practically operationalized.
MAIN BODY: Here, we develop a relational account of autonomy in end-of-life care, one based on a dialogue between lived reality and conceptual thinking. We first show that the complexities of autonomy as experienced by patients and caregivers in end-of-life practices are inadequately acknowledged. Second, we critically reflect on how engaging a notion of relational autonomy can be an adequate answer to addressing these complexities. Our proposal brings into dialogue different ethical perspectives and incorporates multidimensional, socially embedded, scalar, and temporal aspects of relational theories of autonomy. We start our reflection with a case in end-of-life care, which we use as an illustration throughout our analysis.
CONCLUSION: This article develops a relational account of autonomy, which responds to major shortcomings uncovered in the mainstream interpretation of this principle and which can be applied to end-of-life care practices.
As left ventricular assist device (LVAD) technology continues to offer longer and better lives to patients with advanced heart failure, it also redefines how these patients die. This evolving dying process is unfamiliar to many clinicians and can be distressing for patients and their caregivers. No element of this process is more visceral or immediate than the act of withdrawing LVAD support, particularly for a patient who is awake and interactive. Despite ongoing improvement in survival and functional outcomes, LVAD patients frequently experience deaths characterized by distress, confusion, and a lack of control that fail to meet many of the criteria for high-quality end-of-life care.
Fifteen years ago, Ruth Macklin shook the medical community with her claim in the BMJ that dignity is a useless concept. Her essay provoked a storm of reactions. What have we learned from the debate? In this article I analyse the responses to her essay and the following debate to investigate whether she was right that “[d]ignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and can be eliminated without any loss of content.” While some of the commentaries misconstrued her claim and argue against strawmen, others forcefully maintained that the concept of dignity has functions beyond “respect for persons and their autonomy.” One important point that came out of the debate is that dignity is a generic concept that covers more ground than “respect for persons or their autonomy.” In particular, dignity seems to have a wide range of protective functions as well as having reciprocal, relational, and social aspects. Dignity appears more attributional and norm-formative than respect for persons and autonomy. While the claim that dignity is unclear, vague, and can be used sloganistically seems highly relevant, it is argued that this vagueness fulfils important functions in ethics. Moreover, dismissing dignity because of its lack of clarity has implications for “respect for persons” and “autonomy,” which are also used vaguely and sloganistically. No doubt medical ethics should use as a clear concept as the context requires. Nonetheless, dignity still seems to be a widely used generic concept in ethical debates and doing as much ethical work as “respect for persons” or “respect for autonomy.” Therefore, the death of dignity seems to be greatly exaggerated.
Le mot "éthique", lorsqu’il est appliqué aux sciences et à la médecine du vivant, semble recouvrir indifféremment l’"éthique médicale" proprement dite, c’est-à-dire l’exigence d’un certain comportement de la médecine au service du malade, et la bioéthique, qui est la mise en forme, à partir d’une recherche pluridisciplinaire, d’un questionnement sur les conflits de valeurs suscités par le développement techno-scientifique dans le domaine du vivant. Ces deux termes ont, du reste, des champs d’application voisins ou croisés lorsqu’il s’agit du don d’organe ou de l’assistance à la procréation.
Didier Sicard clarifie les enjeux respectifs et communs de l’éthique médicale et de la bioéthique. Il met ainsi en perspective les notions de consentement, de préservation du secret ou encore de non-discrimination, essentielles à cette éthique appliquée.
L'ouvrage aborde des problèmes majeurs de l'éthique médicale actuelle. Il constate que dans le cadre de la santé, pour régler les conflits, on a besoin de recourir à une diplomatie : respectueuse de la loi, l'éthique ne se réfère pas, comme les morales et les religions, à des valeurs transcendantes. S'appuyant sur divers exemples - le sang, les machines - l'auteur montre comment l'éthique médicale affronte des situations dans lesquelles la rationalité ne peut que composer avec des éléments d'ordre symbolique.
Sont abordés également quelques problèmes posés par la robotique et l'informatique : loin de les proscrire, on cherche à leur trouver une juste place à l'intérieur d'un nouvel humanisme.
BACKGROUND: In June 2019, the Australian state of Victoria joined the growing number of jurisdictions around the world to have legalised some form of voluntary assisted dying. A discourse of safety was prominent during the implementation of the Victorian legislation.
MAIN TEXT: In this paper, we analyse the ethical relationship between legislative "safeguards" and equal access. Drawing primarily on Ruger's model of equal access to health care services, we analyse the Victorian approach to voluntary assisted dying in terms of four dimensions: horizontal equity, patient agency, high quality care, and supportive social norms. We argue that some provisions framed as safeguards in the legislation create significant barriers to equal access for eligible patients.
CONCLUSIONS: While safety is undoubtedly ethically important, we caution against an overemphasis on safeguarding in voluntary assisted dying legislation given the implications for equal access.
The current empirical research and normative arguments on physician-assisted dying (PAD) in the Netherlands seem insufficient to provide ethical guidance to general practitioners in the practice of PAD, due to a gap between the evidence and arguments on the one hand and the uncertainties and complexities as found in everyday practice on the other. This paper addresses the problems of current ethical arguments and empirical research and how both seem to be profoundly influenced by the Dutch legislative framework on PAD and a certain view on ethics. Furthermore, the paper elaborates on how other approaches to empirical research in bioethics, such as found in the broad field of narrative research, could supplement the empirical and ethical evaluation of PAD in the Netherlands. This paper also addresses the challenging question of how empirical data-in this case narratives-relate to normativity. The paper is written in the form of a personal narrative of the author, a young Dutch general practitioner and researcher in bioethics. This style is intentionally chosen, to illustrate how work context and professional background influence the observations one makes and the questions one may ask about the topic of PAD. In addition, by using this style, this paper not only gives a different perspective on a much-contested bioethical issue, but also on the challenges faced when a physician-bioethicist has to navigate different disciplinary fields and (moral) epistemological paradigms, especially since the 'empirical turn' in bioethics.
PURPOSE OF REVIEW: I review ethical and legal challenges for end of life (EOL) care in dementia. Is access to hospice care for dementia patients impacted by Medicare's terminal prognosis requirement? Are dementia-specific advance directives warranted? How does state legislation affect dementia patients' EOL options? Should dementia patients' be able to refuse orally ingested food and fluids by advance directive?
RECENT FINDINGS: The difficulty of predicting time to death in dementia inhibits access to Medicare hospice benefits. Efforts have been made to create dementia-specific advance directives. Advance refusal of artificial nutrition and hydration are common, but the issue of oral ingestion of food and fluids by dementia patients remains controversial. Medicare's hospice benefit should be made more accessible to dementia patients. State advance directive threshold definitions should be broadened to include dementia, and capacitated persons who refuse in advance orally ingested food and fluids should have their choices honored.
This article explores the ethical challenges of providing Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) in a paediatric setting. More specifically, we focus on the theoretical questions that came to light when we were asked to develop a policy for responding to MAID requests at our tertiary paediatric institution. We illuminate a central point of conceptual confusion about the nature of MAID that emerges at the level of practice, and explore the various entailments for clinicians and patients that would flow from different understandings. Finally, we consider the ethical challenges of building policy on what is still an extremely controversial social practice. While MAID is currently available to capable patients in Canada who are 18 years or older-a small but important subsection of the population our hospital serves-we write our policy with an eye to the near future when capable young people may gain access to MAID. We propose that an opportunity exists for MAID-providing institutions to reduce social stigma surrounding this practice, but not without potentially serious consequences for practitioners and institutions themselves. Thus, this paper is intended as a road map through the still-emerging legal and ethical landscape of paediatric MAID. We offer a view of the roads taken and considered along the way, and our justifications for travelling the paths we chose. By providing a record of our in-progress thinking, we hope to stimulate wider discussion about the issues and questions encountered in this work.
BACKGROUND: Respect for autonomy is a key concept in contemporary bioethics and end-of-life ethics in particular. Despite this status, an individualistic interpretation of autonomy is being challenged from the perspective of different theoretical traditions. Many authors claim that the principle of respect for autonomy needs to be reconceptualised starting from a relational viewpoint. Along these lines, the notion of relational autonomy is attracting increasing attention in medical ethics. Yet, others argue that relational autonomy needs further clarification in order to be adequately operationalised for medical practice. To this end, we examined the meaning, foundations, and uses of relational autonomy in the specific literature of end-of-life care ethics.
METHODS: Using PRESS and PRISMA procedures, we conducted a systematic review of argument-based ethics publications in 8 major databases of biomedical, philosophy, and theology literature that focused on relational autonomy in end-of-life care. Full articles were screened. All included articles were critically appraised, and a synthesis was produced.
RESULTS: Fifty publications met our inclusion criteria. Twenty-eight articles were published in the last 5 years; publications were originating from 18 different countries. Results are organized according to: (a) an individualistic interpretation of autonomy; (b) critiques of this individualistic interpretation of autonomy; (c) relational autonomy as theoretically conceptualised; (d) relational autonomy as applied to clinical practice and moral judgment in end-of-life situations.
CONCLUSIONS: Three main conclusions were reached. First, literature on relational autonomy tends to be more a 'reaction against' an individualistic interpretation of autonomy rather than be a positive concept itself. Dichotomic thinking can be overcome by a deeper development of the philosophical foundations of autonomy. Second, relational autonomy is a rich and complex concept, formulated in complementary ways from different philosophical sources. New dialogue among traditionally divergent standpoints will clarify the meaning. Third, our analysis stresses the need for dialogical developments in decision making in end-of-life situations. Integration of these three elements will likely lead to a clearer conceptualisation of relational autonomy in end-of-life care ethics. This should in turn lead to better decision-making in real-life situations.
Today's coronavirus pandemic is novel, but the ethical dilemmas it presents are not. In the modern era, physicians have helped patients face the influenza pandemics of 1918, the 1950s, the 1960s, and 2009; HIV/AIDS (1980s and beyond); severe acute respiratory syndrome (2002); and Middle East respiratory syndrome (2015). Physicians cannot do it alone: Institutions must support their efforts (and have a responsibility to provide protection from occupational exposures). Longstanding principles of medical ethics should guide the profession, individual clinicians, health systems, and our society. They must be reaffirmed in the circumstances of health system catastrophes, during which their application—but not the principles themselves—may change. These principles include justice; equity; and, fundamentally, the physician's duty to care for all and not discriminate against a class or category of patients (for example, on the basis of age, race, ethnicity, disability, sex, gender identity, social status, or other personal characteristics).
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Since Oregon implemented its Death with Dignity Act, many additional states have followed suit demonstrating a growing understanding and acceptance of aid in dying (AID) processes. Traditionally, the patient has been the one to request and seek this option out. However, as Death with Dignity acts continue to expand, it will impact the role of physicians and bring up questions over whether physicians have the ethical obligation to facilitate a conversation about AID with patients during end of life discussions. Patients have the right to make informed decisions about their health, which implies that physicians have an obligation to discuss with and inform patients of the options that will accomplish the patients’ goals of care. We will argue that physicians have an ethical obligation to inform certain patients about AID (in qualifying states) during end of life care discussions. We will also address what this obligation encompasses and explore guidelines of when and how these conversations should occur and proceed. Earlier guidelines, presented by various palliative care and ethics experts, for proceeding with such conversations have mostly agreed that the discussion of hospice and end of life care with patients should be initiated early and that the individual goals of a patient during the remaining duration of life should be thoroughly examined before discussion of appropriate options. In discussing AID, physicians should never recommend but inform patients about the basics so that they can make an informed decision. If patients express further interest in AID, the physician should open up the dialogue to address the reasoning behind this decision versus other possible treatments to ensure that patients clearly comprehend the process and implications of their decision. Ultimately, any end of life choice should be made by patients with the full capacity to express what they envision for the remaining duration of life and to comprehend the advantages and disadvantages of all the possible options.
Implementing uncontrolled donation after circulatory determination of death (uDCDD) in the United States could markedly improve supply of donor lungs for patients in need of transplants. Evidence from US pilot programs suggests families support uDCDD, but only if they are asked permission for using invasive organ preservation procedures prior to initiation. However, non-invasive strategies that confine oxygenation to lungs may be applicable to the overwhelming majority of potential uDCDD donors that have airway devices in place as part of standard resuscitation. We propose an ethical framework for lung uDCDD by: (a) initiating post mortem preservation without requiring prior permission to protect the opportunity for donation until an authorized party can be found; (b) using non-invasive strategies that confine oxygenation to lungs; and (c) maintaining strict separation between the healthcare team and the organ preservation team. Attempting uDCDD in this way has great potential to obtain more transplantable lungs while respecting donor autonomy and family wishes, securing public support, and enabling authorized persons to affirm or cease preservation decisions without requiring evidence of prior organ donation intent. It ensures prioritization of life-saving, the opportunity to allow willing donors to donate, and respect for bodily integrity while adhering to current ethical norms.
Death is ubiquitous and inevitable. Many of us have had some experience with death in our personal lives, and as clinicians and researchers, we address death either directly or indirectly, almost every day. Still, there remains significant debate and gaps in knowledge regarding the biology of death, as well as the medical and ethical issues concerning death and dying. This multi-disciplinary issue of the Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine is devoted to exploring the major advances and unresolved questions about death. We present 25 articles representing contributions from researchers that examine death at different biological scales and that provide legal, medical, and ethical perspectives on the process of dying.
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Despite the popularity, success, and growth of programs of organ donation after the circulatory determination of death (DCDD), a long-standing controversy persists over whether the organ donor is truly dead at the moment physicians declare death, usually following five minutes of circulatory and respiratory arrest. Advocates of the prevailing death determination standard claim that the donor is dead when declared because of permanent cessation of respiration and circulation. Critics of this standard argue that while the cessation of respiration and circulation may be permanent, it may not be irreversible at the moment death is declared because, if cardiopulmonary resuscitation were performed, it might succeed. And because irreversibility of cessation of respiration and circulation is required by both the statute and the biological concept of death, the donor must be alive. Who is correct?
Making two related distinctions clarifies the cause of the disagreement over whether the DCDD donor is dead and points to a possible resolution. First, in a determination of death, there is an important distinction between the permanent and the irreversible cessation of circulation and respiration—two associated phenomena that are often confounded. Second, there is an important distinction between the medical practice standard for death determination, in which physicians certify the permanent cessation of vital functions as sufficient for death declaration, and the underlying biological concept of death that requires the irreversible cessation of vital functions because death, by definition, is an irreversible event.
The organ transplantation enterprise is morally flawed. "Brain-dead" donors are the primary source of solid vital organs, and the transplantation enterprise emphasizes that such donors are dead before organs are removed-or in other words that the dead donor rule is followed. However, individuals meeting standard diagnostic criteria for brain death-unresponsiveness, brainstem areflexia, and apnea-are still living, from a physiological perspective. Therefore, removing vital organs from a heart-beating, mechanically ventilated donor is lethal. But neither donors nor surrogates nor the public in general are typically informed of this obviously relevant information. Therefore, donors or surrogates do not provide valid consent for a lethal medical procedure. This is a serious moral failing on the part of the transplant community. To address this concern, I advocate for accurate and fully transparent communication of information to the public to allow for an informed civic dialogue about the ethics and legality of lethal organ procurement. Furthermore, I advocate that systems be put in place by the transplant community to allow for valid consent for lethal organ procurement.
Brain death, or the determination of death by neurological criteria, has been described as a legal fiction. Legal fictions are devices by which the law treats two analogous things (in this case, biological death and brain death) in the same way so that the law developed for one can also cover the other. Some scholars argue that brain death should be understood as a fiction for two reasons: the way brain death is determined does not actually satisfy legal criteria requiring the permanent cessation of all brain function, and brain death is not consistent with the biological conception of death as involving the irreversible cessation of the functioning of an organism as a whole. Critics counter that the idea that brain death is a legal fiction is deceptive and undemocratic. I will argue that diagnosing brain death as a hidden legal fiction is a helpful way to understand its historical development and current status. For the legal-fictions approach to be ethically justifiable, however, the fact that brain death is a legal fiction not aligned with the standard biological conception of death must be acknowledged and made transparent.
Uncontrolled donation after circulatory death, which occurs when an individual has experienced unexpected cardiac arrest, usually not in a hospital, generates both excitement and concern. On the one hand, uDCD programs have the capacity to significantly increase organ donation rates, with good transplant outcomes-mainly for kidneys, but also for livers and lungs. On the other hand, uDCD raises a number of ethical challenges. In this essay, we focus on an issue that is central to all uDCD protocols: When should we cease resuscitation and shift to organ preservation? Do current uDCD protocols prematurely consider as potential donors patients who could still have some chances of meaningful survival? Can the best interest of patients be fostered once they are considered and treated as potential donors?