In 2017 and 2018, the English courts were asked to decide whether continued life-sustaining treatment was in the best interests of three infants: Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans and Isaiah Haastrup. Each infant had sustained catastrophic, irrecoverable brain damage. Dignity played an important role in the best interests assessments reached by the Family division of the High Court in each case. Multiple conceptions of dignity circulate, with potentially conflicting implications for infants such as Charlie, Alfie and Isaiah. The judgements do not explicate the conceptions of dignity upon which they rely. This article reconstructs the conceptions of dignity invoked in these judgements, finding that a broadly Kantian, agential conception dominates, under which human dignity requires the prospect of agency. This conception is situated within the broader body of thought on dignity, and the potentially adverse implications of applying the reconstructed conception in best interests assessments for infants with severely restricted consciousness are discussed.
In a commentary in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) on a ruling of the Texas Supreme Court in Miller v. HCA, George Annas, the NEJM legal analyst, observed, “One bioethical issue is as intractable today as 30 years ago when the topic was first publicly discussed: the extent of parental authority to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an extremely premature infant”. The case involved the resuscitation of a 23-week 615 g infant over parental objections. It took years to resolve the case in the legal system. Nearly two decades later, we might inquire whether neonatologists and other critical care practitioners have greater comfort in dealing with the issue of parental objection?
The Dutch Supreme Court this week ruled that a doctor may act on a previously written euthanasia request and end the life of a patient who, because of advanced dementia, can no longer express their wishes.
Doctors must, however, still adhere to criteria of care for euthanasia practice if they are to avoid prosecution. These, enshrined in the 2002 law, include that the patient is suffering “hopelessly and unbearably” and that the request is “voluntary and well considered,” meaning that the patient must be competent when the request was made.
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In a recent Dutch euthanasia case, a woman underwent euthanasia on the basis of an advance directive, having first been sedated without her knowledge and then restrained by members of her family while the euthanasia was administered. This article considers some implications of the criminal court’s acquittal of the doctor who performed the euthanasia. Supporters of advance euthanasia directives have welcomed the judgement as providing a clarification of the law, especially with regard to the admissibility of contextual evidence in interpreting advance euthanasia directives, but suggested that the law regarding advance euthanasia directives should be further relaxed to remove the requirement of current suffering and that an unfortunate consequence of the prosecution is that it is likely to deter doctors from performing euthanasia even in more straightforward cases. This article argues that the court’s endorsement of the use of contextual evidence is problematic, that the case for prioritising prior decisions over current interests has not been advanced by the discussion surrounding this case and that worries about the alleged deterrent effect are not well founded.
The daughter of a man who successfully fought to establish that patients have a right to be consulted on cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) has launched a High Court challenge against Matt Hancock, the health and social care secretary for England.
Kate Masters has written a letter before action to Hancock after news reports suggested that blanket bans on CPR were being imposed during the covid-19 pandemic.
In the letter, she called on Hancock to give an emergency direction to all healthcare professionals providing that “do not attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation” (DNACPR) orders must not be imposed unless the patient or family have been consulted and certain information provided.
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When it is ethically justifiable to stop medical treatment? For many Muslim patients, families, and clinicians this ethical question remains a challenging one as Islamic ethico-legal guidance on such matters remains scattered and difficult to interpret.
In light of this gap, we conducted a systematic literature review to aggregate rulings from Islamic jurists and juridical councils on whether, and when, it is permitted to withdraw and/or withhold life-sustaining care. A total of 16 fatwas were found, 8 of which were single-author rulings, and 8 represented the collective view of a juridical council. The fatwas are similar in that nearly all judge that Islamic law, provided certain conditions are met, permits abstaining from life-sustaining treatment. Notably, the justifying conditions appear to rely on physician assessment of the clinical prognosis. The fatwas differ when it comes to what conditions justify withdrawing or withholding life- sustaining care. Our analyses suggest that while notions of futility greatly impact the bioethical discourse regarding with holding and/or withdrawal of treatment, the conceptualization of futility lacks nuance. Therefore, clinicians, Islamic jurists, and bioethicists need to come together in order to unify a conception of medical futility and relate it to the ethics of withholding and/or withdrawal of treatment.
On 26 February 2020, the German Constitutional Court rejected a law from 2015 that prohibited any form of ‘business-like’ assisted suicide as unconstitutional. The landmark ruling of the highest federal court emphasised the high priority given to the rights of autonomy and free personal development, both of which constitute the principle of human dignity, the first principle of the German constitution. The ruling echoes particularities of post-war Germany’s end-of-life debate focusing on patient self-determination while rejecting any discussion of active assistance to die through a lethal injection administered by a doctor. This brief report discusses the ruling in the light of the broader sociopolitical and historical context of the German end-of-life debate.
This Viewpoint discusses the legal risks to health care workers and hospital systems from withdrawing or withholding ventilation from COVID-19 patients and cites a Maryland statute that offers legal immunity to clinicians making good faith decisions under emergency conditions as an example for other...
De façon heureusement moins médiatique que pour l’affaire Lambert, des décisions médicales d’arrêt de traitement au titre de l’obstination déraisonnable continuent d’être soumises par les familles au contrôle du juge. Ainsi, le 18 février 2020, le TA de Cergy a eu à se prononcer en référé sur une telle décision prise à l’égard d’un patient âgé de 74 ans, pour lequel il a éprouvé le besoin de préciser que « la seule circonstance qu’un patient, âgé, soit dans un état de coma « profond » sans espoir d’amélioration ne saurait caractériser, par elle-même, une situation dans laquelle la poursuite du traitement apparaîtrait injustifiée au nom du refus de l’obstination déraisonnable ». Si l’affirmation se veut rassurante, la motivation de l’arrêt soulève toutefois quelques interrogations sur l’impact de l’âge avancé du patient sur la décision d’arrêt des traitements ainsi que sur les véritables auteurs d’une telle décision.
OBJECTIVES: The 2014 Court of Appeals decision with respect to Tracey vs Cambridge University Hospital ('the Tracey judgement') changed the requirements for discussing Do Not Attempt Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR) decisions with patients. This study is a retrospective case note review aiming to identify any changes in practice around discussing DNACPR decisions in hospices following the judgement.
METHODS: 150 case notes from 2013 (before the Tracey judgement) were compared with 150 case notes from 2015 (following the Tracey judgement). These notes came from five hospices in the West Midlands. The notes were analysed to determine if the judgement resulted in changes to how frequently DNACPR decisions were discussed with patients and their families, as well as whether there were any changes in the documentation of reasons for not discussing such decisions.
RESULTS: Discussions with patients around DNACPR decisions increased from 31% to 60% and with relatives from 29% to 59% following the Tracey judgement. Prior to the judgement the most frequently documented reason for not discussing was to avoid distress (23%), whereas after judgement it was patients lacking capacity to engage in such a discussion (40%). There was a lack of consistency and clarity in defining the concept of 'physical or psychological harm'.
CONCLUSIONS: Although DNACPR decisions are being discussed more frequently with patients and families following the Tracey judgement, clarity on what constitutes 'physical or psychological harm' caused by these discussions is still required. Future research must examine whether the judgement is delaying or preventing DNACPR decisions being made.
This article discusses a recent ruling by the German Federal Court concerning medical professional liability due to potentially unlawful clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) at the end of life. This case raises important ethical and legal questions regarding a third person's right to judge the value of another person's life and the concept of 'wrongful life'. In our brief report, we discuss the concepts of the 'value of life' and wrongful life, which were evoked by the court, and how these concepts apply to the present case. We examine whether and to what extent value-of-life judgements can be avoided in medical decision-making. The wrongful-life concept is crucial to the understanding of this case. It deals with the question whether life, even when suffering is involved, could ever be worse than death. The effects of this ruling on medical and legal practice in Germany are to be seen. It seems likely that it will discourage claims for compensation following life-sustaining treatment (LST). However, it is unclear to what extent physicians' decisions will be affected, especially those concerning withdrawal of CANH. We conclude that there is a risk that LST may come to be seen as the 'safe' option for the physician, and hence, as always appropriate.
French end-of-life law aims at protecting patients from unreasonable treatments, but has been used to force caregivers to prolong treatments deemed unreasonable. We describe six cases (five intensive care unit patients including two children) where families disagreed with a decision to withdraw treatments and sued medical teams. An emergent inquiry was instigated by the families. In two cases, the court rejected the families' inquiries. In two cases, the families appealed the decision, and in both the first jurisdiction decision was confirmed, compelling caregivers to pursue treatments, even though they deemed them unreasonable. We discuss how this law may be perverted. Legal procedures may result in the units' disorganisation and give rise to caregivers' stress. Families' requests may be subtended by religious beliefs. French end-of-life law has benefits in theoretically constraining physicians to withhold or withdraw disproportionate therapies. These cases underline some caveats and the perverse effects of its literal reading.
Three Belgian doctors have been acquitted of unlawfully poisoning a 38 year old woman almost 10 years ago, in a landmark trial centred on Belgium’s assisted dying law.
During the high profile case the court heard that Tine Nys, who had severe psychiatric problems and had survived earlier suicide attempts, had repeatedly asked to be helped to die under the country’s 2002 legislation.
The law requires the independent opinion of three medical professionals. The two GPs and psychiatrist on trial agreed that Nys met the criterion of unbearable physical and psychological suffering from an incurable illness.
Three Belgian doctors—two GPs and a psychiatrist—are being accused of unlawfully killing a 38 year old patient by poisoning almost 10 years ago, in the country’s first criminal case involving assisted dying.
The high profile trial is focusing on the conditions in the 2002 legislation that must be fulfilled before a request for assisted dying can be acted on. It is also revealing possible gaps in the law and the many emotions that patients, their families, and medical professionals may feel when involved in such a procedure.
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Par son arrêt n°19/08858 du 20 mai 2019, la Cour d’appel de Paris, au nom du droit à la vie, bouscule la redéfinition de la voie de fait opérée par le Tribunal des conflits et l’interprétation donnée à la liberté individuelle par le Conseil constitutionnel.
On 11 September 2019, the verdict was read in the first prosecution of a doctor for euthanasia since the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of 2002 was installed in the Netherlands. The case concerned euthanasia on the basis of an advance euthanasia directive (AED) for a patient with severe dementia. In this paper we describe the review process for euthanasia cases in the Netherlands. Then we describe the case in detail, the judgement of the Regional Review Committees for Termination of Life on Request and Euthanasia (RTE) and the judgement of the medical disciplinary court. Both the review committees and the disciplinary court came to the conclusion there were concerns with this case, which mainly hinged on the wording of the AED. They also addressed the lack of communication with the patient, the absence of oral confirmation of the wish to die and the fact that the euthanasia was performed without the patient being aware of this. However, the doctor was acquitted by the criminal court as the court found she had in fact met all due care criteria laid down in the act. We then describe what this judgement means for euthanasia in the Netherlands. It clarifies the power and reach of AEDs, it allows taking conversations with physicians and the testimony of the family into account when interpreting the AED. However, as a practical consequence the prosecution of this physician has led to fear among doctors about prosecution after euthanasia.
Ce numéro comprend les articles suivants : brain death at fifty: exploring consensus, controversy, and contexts ; would a reasonable person now accept the 1968 Harvard brain death report? A short history of brain death ; a path not taken: beecher, brain death, and the aims of medicine ; Beecher dépassé: fifty years of determining death, legally ; a conceptual justification for brain death ; brain death: a conclusion in search of a justification ; conceptual issues in DCDD donor death determination ; DCDD ddonors are not dead ; uncontrolled DCD: when should we stop trying to save the patient and focus on saving the organs? ; a defense of the dead donor rule ; the dead donor rule as policy indoctrination ; the public's right to accurate and transparent information about brain death and organ transplantation ; brain death and the law: hard cases and legal challenges ; rethinking brain death as a legal fiction: is the terminology the problem? ; respecting choice in definitions of death ; imposing death: religious witness on brain death ; death: an evolving, normative concept ; lessons from the case of Jahi McMath ; the case of Jahi McMath: a neurologist's view ; revisiting death: implicit bias and the case of Jahi MMath.
For nearly five years, bioethicists and neurologists debated whether Jahi McMath, an African American teenager, was alive or dead. While Jahi's condition provides a compelling study for analyzing brain death, circumscribing her life status to a question of brain death fails to acknowledge and respond to a chronic, if uncomfortable, bioethics problem in American health care—namely, racial bias and unequal treatment, both real and perceived. Bioethicists should examine the underlying, arguably broader social implications of what Jahi's medical treatment and experience represented. On any given day, disparities in the quality of health care and health outcomes for people of color in comparison to whites are evidenced in American hospitals and clinics. These disparities are not entirely explained by differences in patient education, insurance status, employment, income, expressed preference for treatments, and severity of disease. Instead, research indicates that, even for African Americans able to gain access to health care services and navigate institutional nuances, disparities persist across a broad range of services, including diagnostic screening and general medical care, mental health diagnosis and treatment, pain management, HIV-related care, and treatments for cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and kidney disease.
The determination of death by neurological criteria-"brain death"-has long been legally established as death in all U.S. jurisdictions. Moreover, the consequences of determining brain death have been clear. Except for organ donation and in a few rare and narrow cases, clinicians withdraw physiological support shortly after determining brain death. Until recently, there has been almost zero action in U.S. legislatures, courts, or agencies either to eliminate or to change the legal status of brain death. Despite ongoing academic debates, the law concerning brain death has remained stable for decades. However, since the Jahi McMath case in 2013, this legal certainty has been increasingly challenged. Over the past five years, more families have been emboldened to translate their concerns into legal claims challenging traditional brain death rules. While novel, these claims are not frivolous. Therefore, it is important to understand them so that we can address them most effectively.
From the start, I followed the case of Jahi McMath with great interest. In December 2013, she clearly fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for brain death. As a neurologist with a special interest in chronic brain death, I was not surprised that, after she was flown to New Jersey, where she became statutorily resurrected and was treated as a comatose patient, Jahi's condition quickly improved. In 2014, her family reported that she sometimes responded to simple motor commands. I shared the general skepticism regarding these reports, assuming that the family was in denial and was misinterpreting spinal myoclonus (a rapid, involuntary twitch generated by the spinal cord) as volitional. The family had noticed that when Jahi's heart rate was above eighty beats per minute, she was more likely to respond, as though the heart rate reflected some sort of inner level of arousal. So they began to make video recordings. I have been privileged to be entrusted with copies of these recordings, forty-eight of which proved suitable for assessing alleged responsiveness. All have been certified by a forensic video expert as unaltered. The first thing that struck me was that the great majority of the alleged responses were not spinal myoclonus. In fact, they did not resemble any type of spontaneous, involuntary movement described in patients paralyzed from high spinal cord lesions.